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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
CONFLICT OF LAWS
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
The meaning of the word "residence" or a similar word or phrase in
a statute has given rise to some difficulty. Ordinarily the question is
whether the legislature meant domicile or merely residence.'
In Board of Education v. Dille the court, in dealing with Ohio Re-
vised Code section 3313.64, relating to free schooling for residents of
the city or school district, held that the statutory word "resident" refers
to residence rather than domicile. However, the decision is weakened
by the fact that the court said that the residence and domicile of the per-
son involved were one and the same. Likewise, the case did not concern
two states, but merely two school districts within the same state.
Hamilton v. Dillon was concerned with the question whether a cer-
tain person had acquired a legal residence in another state, where she had
gone for the purpose of getting a divorce. Without saying that legal
residence and domicile were synonymous in the particular setting, the
court, in reaching its decision, invoked tests peculiar to domicile, rather
than residence.
DIVORCE: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The case of Hamilton v. Dillon4 also involved the question of re-
examining the matter of residence after the granting of a divorce in an-
other state. The husband (or ex-husband) brought an action of habeas
corpus against the superintendent of a state mental hospital, contending
that he was restrained unlawfully because the person who signed the affi-
davit (his wife or ex-wife) was a "resident" of Florida, where she had
obtained the divorce, and not of Ohio, as required by the statute. In her
divorce action she had alleged that Florida was her residence. Because
of her participation in the Florida proceedings, the question of her resi-
dence was res judicata as to her.5 But the court held, on the authority of
the fourth syllabus paragraph in Williams v. North Carolina,' that the
question of residence could be re-examined, inasmuch as the State of
Ohio, through the superintendent of the hospital, was the party raising
1. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 9, comment e (1934); GOODRIcH, CONFLICT
oF LAws §§ 19, 20 (3d ed. 1949).
2. 109 Ohio App. 344, 165 NXE.2d 807 (1959).
3. 110 Ohio App. 489, 167 N.E.2d 356 (1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations
section, p. 507 infra.
4. Supra note 3.
5. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
6. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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the issue, and had not been a party to the Florida action. Thus, the full
faith and credit clause was not applicable.
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
The constitutionality of the act relating to reciprocal enforcement of
support7 was upheld in an opinion by Judge Zimmerman in Levi v. Levi,'
against the argument of lack of due process for want of personal service
in the proceedings in North Carolina, the initiating state. The opinion
gives an excellent picture of the operation of the statute. However, the
syllabus rests the decision solely on the ground that the complaining
party "came to life" too late to challenge the constitutionality; thus, tech-
nically speaking, Judge Zimmerman's remarks about constitutionality do
not constitute part of the decision of the court.
PROCEDURE: CHATTEL MORTGAGES: SUIT FOR DEFICIENCY
It is well settled that matters of procedure are governed by the law
of the forum.9 But it is not always easy to decide what is procedural and
what is substantive. In Mohawk National Bank v. Candler,"0 defendant
bought a car in New York from plaintiff, and gave plaintiff a chattel
mortgage on it. Later, in Ohio, plaintiff repossessed the car and had it
taken back to New York, where he sold it at public auction. He then
sued in Ohio for the deficiency. Ohio Revised Code section 1319.07
prohibits a chattel mortgagee from collecting any deficiency unless he has
given at least ten days notice of the sale and unless the notice includes the
minimum price for which the property will be sold. Plaintiff gave only
a seven day notice, which did not state the minimum price. Nothing was
said in the opinion about the law of New York. Upon the ground that
plaintiff did not comply with the Ohio statute, the court entered judg-
ment for the defendant. The court held that remedies are governed by
the law of the state where suit is brought, as a consequence of which the
giving of the notice about the sale of the automobile was governed by
the law of the forum, which was Ohio. This application of the general
principle puts quite a burden on the plaintiff, who might follow precisely
the notice provisions required by the law of the place of sale, only to find
that later, when he sues the defendant in another state, he is out of court
because of the local requirements.
7. OmIo REv. CODE ch. 3115.
8. 170 Ohio St. 533, 166 N.E.2d 744 (1960). See also discussion in Domestic Relations
section, p. 507 infra.
9. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS 5 585 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLIcr OF LAWS
§ 80 (3d ed. 1949).
10. 166 N.E,2d 540 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
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